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Abstract	
Many	rail	level	crossings	(RLXs)	have	only	passive	protection,	such	as	static	signs	instructing	road	
users	to	stop,	yield,	or	look	for	trains.	Stop	signs	have	been	suggested	as	a	low-cost	option	to	
improve	safety	at	passive	RLXs,	as	requiring	drivers	to	stop	should	encourage	safe	behaviour.	
However,	field	observations	have	noted	high	rates	of	non-compliance	at	stop-controlled	RLXs.	To	
explore	this	further,	we	conducted	an	on-road	study	to	identify	factors	that	influence	compliance	
at	stop-controlled	RLXs.	Twenty-two	drivers	drove	a	30.5km	route	in	rural	Australia,	
encompassing	three	stop-controlled	RLXs.	In	over	half	of	all	cases	(59%)	drivers	stopped	
completely	at	the	RLX;	on	27%	of	crossings	drivers	executed	a	rolling	stop,	and	on	14%	of	
crossings	drivers	violated	the	stop	controls.	Rolling	stops	were	defined	as	a	continuous	
deceleration	to	<10km/h,	but	remaining	above	0km/h,	before	accelerating	to	>10km/h.	
Behavioural	patterns,	including	visual	checks	and	decision-making,	were	similar	when	comparing	
drivers	who	made	complete	versus	rolling	stops.	Non-compliant	drivers	did	not	differ	from	
compliant	drivers	in	approach	speeds,	but	spent	less	time	visually	checking	for	trains.	Post-drive	
interviews	revealed	some	drivers	wilfully	disregarded	the	stop	sign,	whereas	others	did	not	
notice	the	stop	sign.	Those	who	intentionally	violated	noted	trains	were	infrequent	and	
suggested	sight	distance	was	good	enough	(even	though	all	crossings	had	been	formally	assessed	
as	having	inadequate	sight	distance).	Overall	the	results	suggest	most	drivers	exhibit	safe	
behaviour	at	passive	RLXs,	but	a	notable	minority	disregard	or	fail	to	notice	signs.	Potential	
avenues	for	redesigning	passive	RLXs	to	improve	safety	are	discussed.	
Keywords:	rail	level	crossings;	passive	warnings;	stop	signs;	rail	road	crossing	
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1.	 Introduction	
Safety	issues	are	prevalent	at	rail	level	crossings	(RLXs)	worldwide	(Evans,	2011;	Mulvihill	et	al.,	
2016;	Pyrgidis	et	al.,	2016).	Accordingly,	a	range	of	active	and	passive	traffic	control	devices	are	used	to	
guide	road	user	decision-making	at	RLXs.	Active	RLXs	incorporate	warnings	(e.g.,	flashing	lights,	bells)	
and/or	barriers	that	activate	when	a	train	is	approaching,	whereas	passive	RLXs	have	only	static	signs	
and	road	markings.	Crash	analyses	indicate	that	active	RLXs,	especially	those	with	barriers	or	gates,	have	
superior	safety	performance	(Austin	and	Carson,	2002;	McCollister	and	Pflaum,	2007;	Raub,	2009;	
Saccomanno	et	al.,	2007).	However,	passive	RLXs	predominate	in	many	countries,	constituting	
approximately	two-thirds	of	Australia’s	public	RLXs	(ATSB,	2008).	Although	upgrading	to	active	controls	
is	a	government	priority	it	remains	cost-prohibitive,	with	a	low	benefit-cost	ratio	(Cairney	et	al.,	2002).	
This	has	prompted	researchers	and	practitioners	to	seek	cost-effective	ways	of	improving	safety	at	
passive	RLXs	(Read	et	al.,	2017).	
One	low-cost	option	could	be	passive	signs	that	promote	safer	decision-making.	The	prototypical	
sign	at	passive	RLXs	is	a	crossbuck,	sometimes	with	the	instruction	to	yield,	slow	or	look	for	trains	(Yeh	
and	Multer,	2007).	These	configurations	place	the	onus	on	individuals	to	decide	whether	to	stop.	An	
alternative	is	to	add	stop	signs,	which	should	reduce	decision	uncertainty	by	legally	obliging	road	users	
to	stop.	At	stop-controlled	RLXs,	it	is	common	to	have	a	stop	sign	placed	immediately	at	the	RLX,	usually	
with	a	crossbuck	to	indicate	the	presence	of	an	RLX.	Some	stop-controlled	RLXs	include	additional	
signage	(e.g.,	advance	warning	signs	that	signal	an	upcoming	passive	RLX	and/or	the	need	to	stop	ahead)	
and	road	markings,	such	as	a	painted	stop	line	(see	Figure	1).	
	
Figure	1.	Example	configuration	for	a	stop-controlled	rail	level	crossing	in	Australia.	Signs	at	the	crossing	
include	a	crossbuck,	stop	sign,	a	sign	that	says	“LOOK	FOR	TRAINS”	and	signs	flanking	the	road	saying	
“RAILWAY”	and	“CROSSING”.	Signs	on	approach	include	an	icon	of	a	steam	train	(indicating	a	passive	rail	
level	crossing	ahead)	and	a	sign	indicating	a	stop	sign	ahead.	
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1.1.	 Driver	compliance	at	stop-controlled	RLXs	
Stop	controls	theoretically	encourage	all	drivers	to	make	safe,	consistent	decisions	at	passive	
RLXs	(Ward	and	Wilde,	1996).	Supporting	this,	a	recent	simulator	study	found	that	stop	signs	increased	
both	stopping	and	looking	behaviour	at	passive	RLXs	(Liu	et	al.,	2016).	Despite	this,	there	is	evidence	
that	many	drivers	violate	RLX	stop	signs	(Kasalica	et	al.,	2012;	Lenné	et	al.,	2011;	Rudin-Brown	et	al.,	
2012;	Russell	et	al.,	2007;	Tey	et	al.,	2011,	2013).	As	summarised	in	Table	1,	compliance	rates	vary	
greatly,	with	field	observations	in	USA,	Australia	and	Serbia	revealing	real-world	compliance	rates	from	
12%	and	43%	(Kasalica	et	al.,	2012;	Russell	et	al.,	2007;	Tey	et	al.,	2011).	
Compliance	at	stop-controlled	RLXs	tends	to	be	higher	in	simulator	studies,	ranging	from	44%	to	
74%	(Lenné	et	al.,	2011;	Rudin-Brown	et	al.,	2012;	Tey	et	al.,	2013),	but	is	still	well	below	the	compliance	
rates	for	active	controls:	the	same	simulator	studies	found	76-80%	compliance	at	traffic	lights	(Lenné	et	
al.,	2011;	Rudin-Brown	et	al.,	2012)	and	96-100%	compliance	with	flashing	lights	(Lenné	et	al.,	2011;	Tey	
et	al.,	2013).	Two	simulator	studies	incorporated	interviews	that	explored	drivers’	interpretations	of	
traffic	controls.	Strikingly,	29%	of	participants	in	Queensland,	Australia,	and	88%	of	participants	in	
Victorian,	Australia,	suggested	the	correct	response	at	a	stop-controlled	RLX	is	to	“look	for	a	train”	
and/or	“slow	down”	(Rudin-Brown	et	al.,	2012;	Tey	et	al.,	2013).	
Table	1		
Summary	of	previous	research	findings	on	compliance	at	stop-controlled	rail	level	crossings.	
Study	 Location	 Study	type	 Compliance	
Russell	et	al.	(2007)	 Kansas,	USA	 Field	observation	 12%	
Tey	et	al.	(2011)	 Queensland,	Australia	 Field	observation	 41%	
Kasalica	et	al.	(2012)	 Căpljinac,	Serbia	 Field	observation	 43%	†	
Rudin-Brown	et	al.	(2012)	 Victoria,	Australia	 Simulator	 44%	†	
Lenné	et	al.	(2011)	 Victoria,	Australia	 Simulator	 60%	†	
Tey	et	al.	(2013)	 Queensland,	Australia	 Simulator	 67-74%	
†	Denotes	studies	that	only	collected	data	when	a	train	was	approaching,	so	non-compliant	drivers	crossed	in	front	of	an	
oncoming	train.	All	other	studies	represent	a	mix	of	train-present	and	train-absent	encounters.	
1.2.	 Reasons	for	noncompliance	
A	key	limitation	is	that	previous	research	has	not	identified	the	reasons	underlying	
noncompliance.	Although	some	simulator	studies	have	explored	this,	there	remains	limited	
understanding	of	why	some	drivers	disregard	stop	signs	at	RLXs.	This	is	particularly	so	for	RLX	
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encounters	in	naturalistic	settings.	This	is	a	significant	knowledge	gap,	as	understanding	the	factors	
driving	non-compliance	should	inform	the	design	of	interventions	to	prevent	it.	
Researchers	have	suggested	that	noncompliance	in	US	studies	stems	from	“indiscriminate	
application”	of	stop	signs	at	RLXs	(Raub,	2009;	Russell	et	al.,	2007).	US	regulations	permit	installation	of	
stop	signs	at	any	RLX	with	at	least	two	trains	per	day.	This	means	stop	signs	are	used	at	very	low-volume	
RLXs,	whereas	elsewhere	in	the	road	network	they	are	installed	at	relatively	busy	non-RLX	intersections	
(Raub,	2009).	The	consequence	is	that	whereas	drivers	often	encounter	traffic	at	road	intersections	with	
stop	signs,	they	rarely	encounter	trains	at	stop-controlled	RLXs,	meaning	the	RLX	environment	deviates	
from	the	prototypical	stop-controlled	intersection.	
Other	jurisdictions	have	more	stringent	regulations	regarding	the	use	of	stop	controls.	In	
Australia,	stop	signs	are	only	installed	at	RLXs	with	restricted	visibility	on	approach	(Standards	Australia,	
2007).	Specifically,	stop	signs	must	be	used	at	passive	crossings	if	approaching	road	users	would	not	
have	enough	time	to	stop	safely	from	the	point	at	which	they	can	first	see	far	enough	down	the	tracks	to	
detect	an	oncoming	train.	Ideally,	such	strict	regulation	should	foster	greater	compliance;	however,	this	
presupposes	that	drivers	recognise	and	agree	with	the	reasons	for	installing	stop	controls.	This	is	
questionable	given	that	Australian	research	found	many	drivers	declare	“slowing	down”	is	the	
appropriate	response	to	a	stop	sign	(Rudin-Brown	et	al.,	2012;	Tey	et	al.,	2013).	
One	avenue	for	understanding	drivers’	behaviour	is	through	Neisser’s	(1976)	perceptual	cycle	
model,	which	posits	that	our	perception	of	the	world	is	a	constructive,	iterative	process	that	originates	
from	our	schemata,	or	mental	models	of	what	we	expect	to	encounter.	The	content	of	our	schemata	is	
based	on	our	past	knowledge	and	experience,	and	guide	our	exploration	or	information-seeking	within	
our	environment.	The	information	we	sample	through	this	process	is	then	used	to	update	the	relevant	
schema,	so	our	future	understanding	of	situations	will	be	strongly	influenced	by	what	we	have	
encountered	in	the	past.	The	perceptual	cycle	model	and	schema	theory	have	been	applied	to	various	
topics	within	human	factors	and	ergonomics	(Plant	and	Stanton,	2013a,	2013b;	Stanton	et	al.,	2009),	
including	RLX	safety	(Salmon	et	al.,	2013b).	It	has	been	argued	that	inappropriate	decisions	and	actions	
at	RLXs	can	be	explained	as	schema-driven	failures;	for	instance,	if	a	driver	has	encountered	a	specific	
RLX	multiple	times	without	seeing	a	train,	they	may	form	a	strong	expectation	that	they	will	never	see	a	
train	there.	This	type	of	faulty	schemata	can	have	tragic	consequences,	as	in	the	2007	collision	near	
Kerang,	Victoria,	Australia,	in	which	a	truck	driver	failed	to	detect	that	flashing	lights	were	activated	and	
a	train	was	approaching.	In	the	Kerang	collision,	the	truck	driver	had	extensive	experience	with	the	RLX	
in	an	inactive	state,	which	contributed	to	him	making	a	“looked-but-failed-to-see”	error	and	not	
realising	the	RLX	signals	were	active	(Salmon	et	al.,	2013b).	Inappropriate	schema	activation	can	also	
occur	(Norman,	1981).	Here	the	RLX	environment	may	inadvertently	trigger	the	wrong	schemata	in	
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drivers;	for	example,	drivers	may	activate	the	schemata	for	a	standard	active	RLX	if	they	do	not	possess	
relevant	schema	for	stop-controlled	RLXs,	which	in	turn	may	lead	to	the	driver	failing	to	stop	and/or	
adequately	scan	for	trains.	
At	stop-controlled	RLXs,	different	drivers	may	possess	vastly	different	schemata	that	guide	their	
actions.	Drivers	who	have	extensive	experience	at	passive	RLXs	may	possess	schema	that	indicate	stop	
signs	are	unnecessary	(e.g.,	as	in	the	US	example,	where	stop	signs	are	used	indiscriminately,	or	in	
Australia	if	drivers	do	not	appreciate	the	potential	risks),	which	could	lead	them	to	violate	the	warnings.	
Alternatively,	drivers	in	Australia	may	possess	schemata	that	a	stop	sign	signals	a	specific	subtype	of	RLX	
(i.e.,	no	active	warnings,	restricted	visibility),	which	should	prompt	more	cautious	behaviour.	On	the	
other	hand,	drivers	who	are	relatively	unfamiliar	with	stop-controlled	RLXs,	or	passive	RLXs	more	
broadly,	may	not	expect	to	encounter	a	stop	sign	in	that	environment,	and	may	instead	be	searching	for	
flashing	lights	to	guide	their	decision-making	(Salmon	et	al.,	2013a).	These	drivers	may	experience	
difficulty	or	confusion	when	negotiating	the	RLX.	
1.3.	 Crash	risk	at	stop-controlled	RLXs	
Most	published	comparisons	of	crash	risk	between	crossbuck-only	and	stop-controlled	RLXs	have	
utilised	US	data.	Some	analyses	conclude	that,	compared	with	crossbuck-only	or	yield	signs,	stop	
controls	are	associated	with	reduced	injury	risk	(Eluru	et	al.,	2012)	and	lower	crash	rates	(Millegan	et	al.,	
2009;	Saccomanno	et	al.,	2007;	Yan	et	al.,	2010a,	2010b).	Other	studies	find	that	crash	rates	are	
equivalent	(McCollister	and	Pflaum,	2007)	or	even	increased	at	stop	crossings	(Austin	and	Carson,	2002;	
Raub,	2009).	The	reason	for	this	inconsistency	is	unclear,	but	may	be	due	to	non-compliance	(e.g.,	if	
stop	signs	are	installed	at	more	dangerous	RLXs,	but	drivers	ignore	them,	crash	rates	will	be	higher).	
1.4.	 The	current	study	
The	current	study	aimed	to	understand	drivers’	reasons	for	non-compliance	at	passive	stop-
controlled	crossings,	as	first	step	to	identifying	possible	avenues	for	improving	safety.	Participants	drove	
an	instrumented	vehicle	around	a	pre-determined	route	that	incorporated	three	stop-controlled	RLXs	
and	seven	other	RLXs.	Multiple	objective	and	subjective	data	sources	(e.g.,	vehicle	parameters,	visual	
checking	behaviour,	video	footage,	concurrent	think	aloud	protocols,	post-drive	interviews)	were	
combined	to	provide	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	reasons	for	drivers’	compliance	or	non-
compliance	at	stop-controlled	RLXs.	
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2.	 Method	
2.1.	 Participants	
Twenty-two	drivers	(11	novice,	11	experienced)	participated	voluntarily	and	were	financially	
reimbursed	for	their	time.	Novice	drivers	(19-21	years)	had	12-24	months	driving	experience.	
Experienced	drivers	(33-55	years)	had	at	least	10	years	driving	experience.	Table	2	shows	the	sample	
demographic	characteristics.	Participants	were	recruited	through	local	newspapers,	noticeboards,	
community	groups	and	word-of-mouth.	All	lived	and/or	worked	locally	and	regularly	drove	in	the	region.	
Ethical	aspects	of	the	research	were	approved	by	Monash	University	Human	Research	Ethics	Committee	
(CF12/0077–2012000016).	
Table	2		
Demographic	characteristics	of	participants.	
	 Novice	 Experienced	 Difference	
Sex	 6	females,	5	males	 6	females,	5	males	 n/a	
Age	(years)	 19.3	(0.6)	 45.1	(7.6)	 t(10.1)	=	-11.23,	p	<	.001,	
R2	=	.93	
Driving	experience	
(years)	
1.6	(0.3)	 27.3	(7.6)	 t(10.0)	=	-11.28,	p	<	.001,	
R2	=	.93	
Driving	exposure	
(hours	per	week)	
6.6	(7.9)	 17.1	(14.5)	 t(15.5)	=	-2.10,	p	=	.052,	
R2	=	.22	
Note.	t-tests	computed	with	equal	variances	not	assumed	because	Levene’s	Test	for	Equality	of	Variances	was	significant	for	
all	comparisons.	
2.2.	 Route	and	target	RLX	types	
The	study	route	was	30.5km	around	Bendigo,	a	regional	city	approximately	150km	north-west	of	
Melbourne,	Australia.	The	region	encompasses	three	commuter	and	freight	train	lines	and	contains	a	
high	density	of	RLXs.	The	route	incorporated	urban	and	rural	roads	with	varying	environments,	terrain	
and	speed	limits.	Drivers	crossed	three	stop-controlled	RLXs	(see	Figure	2)	and	seven	additional	RLXs	
(one	passive,	six	active).	The	focus	here	is	on	the	stop-controlled	RLXs	only,	as	in	previous	work	we	have	
analysed	data	from	the	other	RLX	types	(Lenné	et	al.,	2013a,	2013b;	Salmon	et	al.,	2013a,	2014a).	
2.2.1.	 Stop-controlled	RLX	1.	This	RLX	was	encountered	10km	into	the	route,	travelling	north-
west	on	an	unsealed	gravel	road	in	a	rural-residential	area.	The	speed	limit	was	50km/h,	although	there	
were	no	visible	speed	signs	on	approach.	The	road	curves	for	1km	but	is	straight	for	100m	approaching	
the	RLX,	then	ends	in	a	T-intersection	40m	after	the	RLX.	At	the	RLX	there	were	four	signs:	a	rectangular	
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sign	with	a	white	crossbuck	on	a	red	background;	a	stop	sign;	a	“LOOK	FOR	TRAINS”	sign;	and	a	pair	of	
“RAILWAY	CROSSING”	signs	flanking	the	road.	On	approach,	there	was	an	advisory	sign	indicating	the	stop	
sign	ahead.	There	were	no	road	markings	related	to	the	RLX.	Visibility	along	the	train	line	was	obscured	
by	foliage	on	both	sides.	
	
RLX	1	
	
RLX	2	
	
RLX	3	
Figure	2.	Approach	views	of	the	three	stop-controlled	rail	level	crossings	(RLXs)	in	the	on-road	test	
route.	
2.2.2.	 Stop-controlled	RLX	2.	This	RLX	was	encountered	23.6km	into	the	route,	travelling	south-
east	on	a	sealed	road	in	a	rural	area.	The	speed	limit	on	the	road	was	80km/h	but	dropped	to	60km/h	
shortly	before	the	RLX.	The	road	is	mainly	straight	with	some	gentle	curves	for	1.5km	and	is	completely	
straight	for	130m	approaching	the	RLX.	At	the	RLX	there	were	four	signs:	a	white	crossbuck;	a	stop	sign;	
a	“LOOK	FOR	TRAINS”	sign;	and	a	pair	of	“RAILWAY	CROSSING”	signs	flanking	the	road.	On	approach,	there	was	
an	advisory	sign	indicating	the	stop	sign	ahead,	and	faded	road	markings	that	said	“RAIL	X”.	Road	
markings	at	the	RLX	were	a	painted	white	stop	line	and	double	white	centre	dividing	lines.	Visibility	
along	the	train	line	was	obscured	by	foliage	on	both	sides	on	approach,	and	by	an	embankment	on	the	
right.	
2.2.3.	 Stop-controlled	RLX	3.	This	RLX	was	encountered	26km	into	the	route,	travelling	north-
west	on	a	sealed	road.	(This	was	the	same	crossing	as	RLX	2,	traversed	in	the	opposite	direction.)	The	
speed	limit	was	60km/h	on	approach	to	the	RLX.	Participants	turned	onto	the	road	350m	before	the	
RLX,	which	is	straight	for	170m	approaching	the	RLX.	At	the	RLX	there	were	four	signs:	a	white	
crossbuck;	a	stop	sign;	a	“LOOK	FOR	TRAINS”	sign;	and	a	pair	of	“RAILWAY	CROSSING”	signs	flanking	the	road.	
On	approach,	there	was	an	advisory	sign	with	an	image	of	a	steam	train.	Road	markings	at	the	RLX	were	
a	painted	white	stop	line	and	double	white	centre	dividing	lines;	there	were	no	visible	RLX	road	markings	
on	approach.	Visibility	along	the	train	line	was	obscured	by	foliage	on	both	sides.	
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2.3.	 Instrumented	Vehicle	
Participants	drove	Monash	University	Accident	Research	Centre’s	On-Road	Test	Vehicle,	an	
instrumented	vehicle	that	collects	vehicle-related	data	and	records	in-vehicle	and	external	events	using	
seven	cameras.	Eye	and	head	movements	were	measured	using	an	Arrington	Binocular	Scene	Camera	
60Hz	head-mounted	system.	Each	driver’s	gaze	was	calibrated	using	a	nine-point	calibration	grid	prior	to	
the	drive.	Due	to	ambient	light	variations,	calibration	quality	was	insufficient	to	code	eye	movements,	so	
only	gross	head	movements	were	analysed.	
2.4.	 Procedure	
Participants	were	not	informed	that	the	research	focused	on	RLXs,	but	rather	were	told	that	the	
aim	of	the	study	was	to	examine	how	drivers	respond	to	different	road	environments	(e.g.,	town	centre	
vs.	rural	highway	vs.	gravel	road).	Participants	provided	written	informed	consent,	completed	a	brief	
demographic	questionnaire,	and	received	10-15	minutes’	training	in	the	concurrent	verbal	protocol	
technique.	This	began	in	the	interview	room,	where	a	researcher	explained	the	“think	aloud”	task	with	
extensive	examples	of	the	types	of	verbalisations	that	they	should	make.	The	participant	was	then	taken	
to	the	instrumented	vehicle	and	asked	to	familiarise	themselves	with	the	vehicle	and	set	up	the	driver’s	
seat,	mirrors	and	eye-tracker.	Participants	completed	a	10-minute	practice	drive,	with	further	
concurrent	verbal	protocol	training:	for	the	first	2	minutes	a	researcher	provided	an	example	concurrent	
verbal	protocol,	and	for	the	remainder	of	the	practice	drive	the	participant	provided	the	concurrent	
verbal	protocol,	with	the	researcher	providing	feedback	as	appropriate.	
The	test	route	took	around	40	minutes	and	began	once	the	participant	was	comfortable	driving	
the	vehicle.	Two	researchers	accompanied	the	participant:	one	in	the	front	seat	providing	navigation	
instructions,	and	one	in	the	back	seat	running	the	data	collection	systems.	Throughout	the	test	route	
participants	provided	a	concurrent	verbal	protocol	to	support	assessment	of	their	situation	awareness	
(Salmon	et	al.,	2014b)	and	were	prompted	to	resume	their	verbal	protocol	if	they	became	silent	for	
extended	periods.	A	recent	on-road	study	undertaken	to	test	the	impact	of	providing	a	concurrent	
verbal	protocol	on	driver	behaviour	found	no	adverse	impacts	on	driving	performance	(Salmon	et	al.,	
2017).	
After	the	drive	participants	completed	two	Critical	Decision	Method	(CDM)	interviews	(Klein	et	
al.,	1989).	Each	CDM	focused	on	a	single	RLX	encounter,	which	yielded	a	total	of	12	interviews	about	
stop-controlled	RLXs	(and	32	focusing	on	other	RLXs).	CDM	has	been	used	to	examine	naturalistic	
decision	making	across	a	range	of	domains	(Hoffman	et	al.,	1998;	Plant	and	Stanton,	2013;	Stanton	et	
al.,	2007),	including	RLXs	(Mulvihill	et	al.,	2016).	Although	CDM	was	developed	to	study	expert	decision-
making,	it	has	been	successfully	adapted	to	examine	decision-making	while	driving	(Beanland	et	al.,	
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2016;	Stanton	et	al.,	2007;	Walker	et	al.,	2009;	Young	et	al.,	2015).	At	the	beginning	of	each	interview,	
the	participant	was	asked	to	describe	a	specific	RLX	encounter	in	as	much	detail	as	possible.	They	were	
then	asked	to	summarise	the	situation,	including	the	decision	they	made.	Following	this,	the	interviewer	
used	a	series	of	prompts	designed	to	assist	recall	of	past	events	and	explore	factors	that	influenced	the	
individual’s	decision	(e.g.,	personal	goals,	environmental	cues,	information	use,	experience)	and	their	
situation	awareness	(for	a	full	list	of	prompts	used,	see	Read	et	al.,	2017).	The	interviewer	took	notes	
during	the	drive	to	further	prompt	recall	and	clarify	comments	as	required	(e.g.,	“during	the	drive	you	
said	you	didn’t	think	this	train	line	was	used.”)	
2.5.	 Data	Analysis	
Data	were	recorded	continuously	throughout	the	route,	but	for	the	current	analyses	110m	
segments	were	extracted,	encompassing	100m	on	approach	and	10m	after	each	RLX.	The	approach	
distance	of	100m	was	selected	as	this	comprised	a	straight	section	of	road	for	all	crossings.	At	this	point	
drivers	could	see	the	RLX	ahead,	but	did	not	have	adequate	sight	distance	to	detect	an	oncoming	train	
with	enough	time	to	stop.	Three	data	sources	were	analysed	for	each	segment:	travel	speed	(km/h);	
visual	checks;	and	verbal	protocols.	Visual	checks	were	defined	as	a	head	movement	>30°	from	straight	
ahead,	during	which	the	participant	was	looking	outside	the	vehicle,	on	approach	to	the	RLX	or	at	the	
stop	line.	
Participants’	verbal	protocols	and	CDMs	were	transcribed	verbatim	and	then	coded	by	two	
independent	raters.	For	verbal	protocols,	each	RLX	segment	was	coded	for	key	concepts,	which	were	
derived	by	initially	reviewing	transcripts	and	noting	elements	that	drivers	mentioned,	then	grouping	
these	in	themes.	Only	concepts	directly	relevant	to	the	RLX	were	coded.	This	resulted	in	10	concepts	
under	two	broad	themes:	the	decision	made	(stopping,	slowing,	not	stopping)	and	factors	that	
influenced	drivers’	decisions	(rail	level	crossing,	stop	sign,	visual	information,	auditory	information,	
absence	of	trains,	absence	of	active	controls,	and	safety).	CDM	transcripts	were	coded	for	concepts	
relating	to	the	driver’s	goals,	use	of	available	information,	key	influencing	factors	and	experience	that	
informed	the	decision,	and	alternative	courses	of	action,	to	understand	how	they	made	the	decision	of	
whether	to	stop	or	proceed	and	how	they	rejected	alternative	actions.	Inter-rater	agreement	was	94%	
(κ	=	.92)	for	verbal	protocols	and	92%	(κ	=	.91)	for	CDMs.	
3.	 Results	
3.1.	 Traffic	conditions	
Across	22	participants	there	were	66	encounters	at	stop-controlled	RLXs.	Inspection	of	forward-
facing	camera	footage	from	the	instrumented	vehicle	revealed	no	situations	in	which	participants’	
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driving	behaviour	was	directly	influenced	by	other	road	users	(e.g.,	lead	vehicle	stopping,	requiring	the	
participant	to	stop),	and	few	situations	with	potential	for	indirect	influence	(e.g.,	another	vehicle	
proceeding	through	at	speed,	prompting	the	participant	to	behave	similarly).	No	trains	were	present	
during	any	crossings,	and	during	54	crossings	(82%)	participants	did	not	encounter	any	other	traffic.	
When	traffic	was	present	it	was	minimal,	typically	a	vehicle	travelling	in	the	opposite	direction	(n	=	8)	or	
cyclists	on	the	roadside	(n	=	2).	Most	of	these	other	road	users	did	not	cross	the	RLX,	or	crossed	after	
the	participant.	There	was	only	one	case	in	which	another	driver	crossed	in	the	opposite	direction	
immediately	before	a	participant;	this	other	driver	failed	to	stop	but	the	participant	came	to	a	complete	
stop.	
3.2.	 Approach	speeds	and	stopping	behaviour	
Participants	came	to	a	complete	stop	(0km/h)	at	59%	of	crossings.	On	a	further	27%	of	crossings	
drivers	executed	a	rolling	stop,	defined	as	a	minimum	speed	above	0km/h	but	below	10km/h.	On	the	
remaining	9	crossings	(14%)	drivers	violated	the	stop	controls,	with	minimum	travel	speeds	up	to	
56.4km/h.	Of	these	9	incidents,	4	involved	experienced	drivers	and	5	involved	novice	drivers.	There	was	
a	trend	whereby	experienced	drivers	were	more	likely	to	stop	completely,	and	novice	drivers	were	more	
likely	to	make	rolling	stops,	but	the	association	between	driving	experience	and	stopping	behaviour	was	
not	statistically	significant,	χ2(2)	=	3.37,	p	=	.186.	As	travel	speeds	(and	visual	checks,	see	section	3.3)	did	
not	differ	between	novice	and	experienced	drivers,	driving	experience	was	not	included	as	a	variable	in	
subsequent	statistical	analyses.	
Most	drivers	behaved	consistently	across	RLXs:	41%	were	compliant	(9	drivers:	7	experienced,	2	
novice),	i.e.,	they	always	stopped	completely;	36%	were	cautious	(8	drivers:	2	experienced,	6	novice),	
i.e.,	they	always	made	at	least	a	rolling	stop;	and	9%	were	consistently	non-compliant	(2	drivers:	1	
experienced,	1	novice),	i.e.,	they	violated	at	all	three	RLXs.	Only	14%	were	inconsistently	non-compliant	
(3	drivers:	1	experienced,	2	novice),	i.e.,	they	were	non-compliant	at	only	one	RLX.	
Figure	3	illustrates	the	relationship	between	approach	speeds	100m	from	the	RLX	and	
subsequent	stopping	behaviour.	Among	the	full	sample	there	was	no	significant	correlation	between	
approach	speeds	and	stopping	behaviour,	r(66)	=	.11,	p	=	.367.	However,	when	including	only	violators,	
there	was	a	significant	large	correlation	between	approach	speeds	100m	away	and	minimum	speed	
through	the	RLX,	r(9)	=	.87,	p	=	.002.	This	suggests	that	approach	speeds	do	not	predict	the	intention	to	
violate,	but	among	drivers	who	do	violate,	their	approach	speed	reflects	the	speed	at	which	they	
negotiate	the	intersection.	
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Figure	3.	Relationship	between	approach	speed	(i.e.,	travel	speed	100m	from	the	RLX)	and	stopping	
behaviour	at	three	stop-controlled	RLXs.	Ovals	indicate	the	three	types	of	stopping	behaviour	used	in	
statistical	analyses:	“complete	stop”	indicates	a	minimum	speed	of	0km/h;	“rolling	stop”	indicates	that	
the	driver	decelerated	to	a	minimum	speed	of	<10km/h	before	accelerating	and	proceeding	through	the	
crossing;	and	“non-compliant”	indicates	that	the	driver	proceeded	through	the	RLX	with	a	minimum	
speed	above	10km/h.	Dotted	green	line	represents	the	linear	trend	line	for	the	association	between	
approach	speed	and	minimum	speeds	for	non-compliant	drivers.	
Figure	4	shows	speed	profiles	throughout	each	110m	RLX	segment.	Each	RLX	was	analysed	
separately	as	approach	speeds	differed	between	crossings.	Average	speeds	were	binned	into	10m	
segments	and	then	compared	between	drivers	who	violated	the	stop	controls	(i.e.,	minimum	travel	
speed	>10km/h)	and	those	who	made	complete	or	rolling	stops	(the	latter	groups	were	combined	as	
their	speed	profiles	were	similar).	Each	10m	segment	was	compared	using	t-tests,	to	reveal	the	first	
point	at	which	violators	and	compliant	drivers	exhibited	significantly	different	speeds.		
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Ap
pr
oa
ch
 Sp
ee
d:
 10
0m
 fr
om
 R
LX
 (k
m
/h
)
Minimum Speed at RLX (km/h)
RLX 1
RLX 2
RLX 3
Complete Stop
Rolling Stop
Non-compliant
DRIVER	BEHAVIOUR	AT	STOP-CONTROLLED	RAIL	LEVEL	CROSSINGS	 13	
	
Figure	4.	Speed	profiles	for	compliant	(stop/rolling	stop)	and	non-compliant	drivers	when	negotiating	
three	stop-controlled	RLXs.	Shaded	segments	indicate	points	when	travel	speeds	were	significantly	
higher	for	non-compliant	drivers.	Error	bars	represent	±1	standard	error	of	the	mean.	
For	RLX	1,	speeds	were	only	significantly	different	in	the	period	10-0m	before	the	RLX,	
t(3.2)	=	3.66,	p	=	.032,Mdiff	=	10.8km/h,	SE	=	2.9,	95%	CI[1.6,19.9].	For	RLX	3,	compliant	drivers	first	
exhibited	significantly	lower	speeds	during	the	period	20-10m	before	the	RLX,	t(20)	=	3.57,	p	=	.002,	
Mdiff	=	17.6km/h,	SE	=	4.9,	95%	CI[7.3,27.9],	and	then	continued	to	maintain	lower	speeds	until	10m	
after	the	RLX,	t(20)	=	6.28,	p	<	.001,	Mdiff	=	17.3km/h,	SE	=	2.8,	95%	CI[11.5,23.0].	In	contrast,	differences	
in	travel	speeds	began	much	earlier	at	RLX	2,	with	the	first	significant	difference	during	the	period	70-
60m	before	the	RLX,	t(20)	=	2.06,	p	=	.025,	Mdiff	=	6.8km/h,	SE	=	2.8,	95%	CI[1.1,15.0].	These	discrepant	
patterns	are	likely	the	result	of	the	“pre-approach”	road	environment:	RLX	1	was	at	the	end	of	a	gravel	
road	and	RLX	3	occurred	350m	after	an	intersection,	so	travel	speeds	were	relatively	low	even	before	
the	final	100m	approach	to	the	RLX,	whereas	RLX	2	was	on	a	longer	road	where	the	speed	limit	dropped	
from	80km/h	to	60km/h	within	the	last	500m.	
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3.3.	 Visual	checking	
The	number,	duration	and	timing	of	visual	checks	made	on	approach	to	each	RLX	was	analysed	
using	generalised	estimating	equations,	an	extension	of	the	general	linear	model	that	permits	analysis	of	
repeated	measurements	with	varying	conditions.	This	approach	was	adopted	as	some	drivers	exhibited	
different	stopping	behaviour	at	each	RLX.	The	analysis	used	a	linear	model	with	and	exchangeable	
correlation	matrix,	with	stopping	behaviour	(complete	stop,	rolling	stop,	non-compliant)	and	RLX	(1,	2,	
3)	as	factors.	Reference	groups	were	“complete	stop”	for	stopping	behaviour	and	“RLX	1”	for	RLX.	
The	number	of	visual	checks	made	ranged	from	0	to	10,	and	varied	significantly	according	to	
both	RLX,	χ2(2)	=	15.43,	p	<	.001,	and	stopping	behaviour,	χ2(2)	=	19.85,	p	<	.001,	but	the	interaction	
between	factors	was	not	significant	(see	Figure	5).	Non-compliant	drivers	made	significantly	fewer	visual	
checks	than	those	who	stopped	completely	(B	=	-2.26,	SE	=	0.66,	χ2	=	11.68,	p	=	.001),	and	the	sole	
driver	who	made	no	visual	checks	was	non-compliant.	However,	there	was	no	difference	in	number	of	
visual	checks	made	when	comparing	drivers	who	made	complete	stops	vs.	rolling	stops	(B	=	0.05,	
SE	=	0.38,	χ2	=	0.02,	p	=	.887).	Drivers	executed	fewer	visual	checks	at	RLX	1	compared	to	both	RLX	2	
(B	=	1.18,	SE	=	0.38,	χ2	=	9.96,	p	=	.002)	and	RLX	3	(B	=	0.98,	SE	=	0.38,	χ2	=	9.03,	p	=	.003).	
The	total	duration	of	visual	checks	made	ranged	from	1.6	to	16.7	seconds,	and	varied	
significantly	with	RLX,	χ2(2)	=	17.35,	p	<	.001,	and	stopping	behaviour,	χ2(2)	=	18.27,	p	<	.001	(see	Figure	
5).	As	with	number	of	visual	checks,	non-compliant	drivers	spent	significantly	less	time	making	visual	
checks	than	those	who	stopped	completely	(B	=	-2.45,	SE	=	0.72,	χ2	=	11.76,	p	=	.001),	but	there	was	no	
difference	between	drivers	who	made	complete	stops	vs.	rolling	stops	(B	=	-0.39,	SE	=	0.74,	χ2	=	0.28,	
p	=	.597).	Duration	of	visual	checks	was	also	shorter	at	RLX	1	compared	with	both	RLX	2	(B	=	1.89,	
SE	=	0.59,	χ2	=	10.18,	p	=	.001)	and	RLX	3	(B	=	1.69,	SE	=	0.48,	χ2	=	12.20,	p	<	.001).	
DRIVER	BEHAVIOUR	AT	STOP-CONTROLLED	RAIL	LEVEL	CROSSINGS	 15	
	
Figure	5.	Average	number	(left	panel)	and	duration	(right	panel)	of	visual	checks	made	by	drivers	at	
three	stop-controlled	level	crossings.	Error	bars	represent	±1	standard	error	of	the	mean.	Non-
compliant	drivers	(i.e.,	those	proceeded	through	with	a	minimum	speed	>10km/h)	made	fewer	visual	
checks	and	spent	less	time	checking	for	trains.	Visual	checking	behaviour	was	not	significantly	different	
between	drivers	who	made	complete	vs.	rolling	stops.	
The	timing	of	the	first	and	last	visual	checks	made	was	analysed	as	time	in	seconds	relative	to	the	
point	at	which	drivers	first	reached	the	stop	line	before	the	RLX.	(As	RLX	1	did	not	have	a	stop	line,	this	
was	measured	as	the	equivalent	distance	from	the	tracks.)	As	such,	positive	values	indicate	visual	checks	
made	before	reaching	the	stop	line,	and	negative	values	indicate	visual	checks	made	after	reaching	the	
stop	line	(see	Figure	6).	Participants	made	their	first	visual	check	an	average	of	4.6	seconds	(SD	=	4.0)	
before	the	stop	line,	and	this	timing	did	not	vary	between	RLXs,	χ2(2)	=	0.16,	p	=	.924,	or	with	stopping	
behaviour,	χ2(2)	=	2.28,	p	=	.320,	although	there	was	a	trend	towards	non-compliant	drivers	beginning	
their	visual	checks	sooner.	
Participants	made	their	final	visual	check	an	average	of	3.1	seconds	(SD	=	1.9)	after	reaching	the	
stop	line;	as	most	drivers	stopped	completely,	this	occurred	while	they	were	still	stopped	or	while	they	
were	in	the	process	of	crossing	the	tracks.	The	timing	of	the	final	visual	check	varied	with	stopping	
behaviour,	χ2(2)	=	33.51,	p	<	.001	(see	Figure	6).	Non-compliant	drivers	made	their	final	visual	check	
significantly	earlier	than	those	who	stopped	completely	(B	=	3.15,	SE	=	0.55,	χ2	=	33.31,	p	<	.001).	Drivers	
who	made	rolling	stops	also	completed	their	visual	checks	earlier	than	those	who	stopped	completely	
(B	=	0.79,	SE	=	0.36,	χ2	=	4.72,	p	=	.030).	Timing	of	the	final	visual	check	did	not	differ	between	RLXs,	
χ2(2)	=	0.81,	p	=	.668.	
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Figure	6.	Timing	of	first	and	final	visual	checks	on	approach	to	RLXs,	measured	relative	to	the	time	at	
which	the	driver	first	reached	the	stop	line.	Error	bars	represent	±1	standard	error	of	the	mean.	
3.4.	 Verbal	protocol	analysis	
	 Participants’	concurrent	verbal	protocols	on	approach	to	stop-controlled	RLXs	were	coded	for	
key	concepts;	the	results	are	shown	in	Figure	7.	When	drivers	executed	a	complete	stop	the	most	
common	concepts	mentioned	were:	the	RLX	itself	(e.g.,	“there's	a	railway	crossing	coming	up”);	visual	
information	(e.g.,	“look	both	ways,	there's	no	trains	coming”,	“my	vision	to	the	right	isn’t	very	good”);	
the	stop	sign	(e.g.,	“there's	a	stop	sign	on	the	railway	crossing”);	stopping	(e.g.,	“I’ll	slow	right	down,	I’m	
not	that	familiar	with	the	crossing.	I’ll	stop,	actually”);	and	the	absence	of	trains	(e.g.,	“doesn’t	seem	like	
there's	any	trains”).	Explicit	mentions	of	safety	(e.g.,	“it’s	all	safe”)	were	rare	and	were	only	made	by	
drivers	who	executed	a	complete	stop.	When	drivers	executed	rolling	stops,	the	most	common	concepts	
mentioned	were	again	the	RLX,	visual	information,	the	absence	of	trains,	stopping,	and	the	stop	sign.	
Non-compliant	drivers	mentioned	fewer	concepts	on	average	than	drivers	who	made	rolling	or	
complete	stops,	as	shown	in	Figure	7.	The	most	frequently	mentioned	concepts	by	non-compliant	
drivers	were	visual	information	(56%)	and	the	RLX	itself	(56%).	Less	than	half	the	violators	(44%)	
acknowledged	the	stop	sign,	and	only	two	(22%)	mentioned	the	absence	of	a	train.	Two	violators	also	
explicitly	mentioned	that	they	did	not	want/intend	to	stop	before	they	proceeded	through	the	RLX	(e.g.,	
“they	want	me	to	stop	for	but	to	tell	you	the	truth	I	don’t	think	I’m	going	to.”).	
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Figure	7.	Radar	plot	depicting	the	percentage	of	drivers	who	mentioned	specific	concepts	on	approach	
to	stop-controlled	RLXs,	according	to	stopping	behaviour:	Complete	Stop	(n	=	39);	Rolling	Stop	(n	=	18);	
or	Violation	(n	=	9).	
3.5.	 Post-drive	CDM	interviews	
	 Twelve	drivers	completed	post-drive	CDM	interviews	regarding	one	of	their	encounters	at	a	
stop-controlled	RLX.	This	included:	5	complete	stops	(4	experienced,	1	novice);	2	rolling	stops	(both	
novice);	and	5	non-compliant	encounters	(2	experienced,	3	novice).	
	 3.5.1.	 Complete	stops.	The	five	CDMs	with	drivers	who	stopped	completely	all	focused	on	RLX	1.	
These	drivers’	primary	goals	were	to	cross	the	RLX	safely	and/or	to	stop	and	check	for	trains.	The	most	
important	influencing	factor,	mentioned	by	all	drivers	who	stopped	completely,	was	the	stop	sign	itself.	
All	drivers	opined	that	they	had	used	all	available	information	to	make	their	decision,	and	most	
experienced	drivers	reported	that	no	other	information	was	required,	with	one	suggesting	an	advance	
warning	sign	and/or	other	vehicles	(e.g.,	stopped	on	the	other	side	of	the	RLX)	would	be	helpful.	The	
novice	driver	indicated	that	flashing	lights	(but	not	necessarily	a	boom	gate)	would	be	a	useful	addition.		
	 Experienced	drivers	reported	drawing	on	general	driving	experience	to	assist	their	decision-
making,	including	experience	at	other	stop-controlled	intersections	(i.e.,	road	intersections)	and	general	
DRIVER	BEHAVIOUR	AT	STOP-CONTROLLED	RAIL	LEVEL	CROSSINGS	 18	
knowledge	of	road	rules,	even	though	they	had	experience	with	passive	RLXs.	In	contrast,	the	novice	
driver	reported	drawing	on	experience	with	other	passive	RLXs.	Most	drivers	said	stopping	was	an	
automatic	decision	with	no	time	pressure;	“it	was	a	no	brainer”.	Only	one	driver	felt	time	pressure,	
because	the	car	gathered	speed	downhill	and	was	going	faster	than	they	were	comfortable	with.	
	 Drivers	who	stopped	completely	suggested	that	stopping	at	the	RLX	was	the	only	viable	option,	
although	it	is	theoretically	possible	to	ignore	the	stop	sign.	One	driver	indicated	they	might	consider	
proceeding	through	without	stopping	if	in	a	hurry,	whereas	others	suggested	they	would	only	proceed	
without	stopping	if	there	was	no	stop	sign,	or	if	it	was	an	emergency	(e.g.,	a	vehicle	close	behind	was	
about	to	hit	them).	Drivers	mentioned	the	need	to	obey	road	rules	(e.g.,	“You	have	to	do	what	the	law	
says.”),	with	some	linking	this	to	enforcement	(e.g.,	“I’ve	only	got	one	demerit	point	left.	I	need	to	do	
everything	right.”)	Some	experienced	drivers	understood	the	stop	sign	was	installed	for	a	reason:	“you	
obviously	see	the	stop	sign	and	realise	that	there’s	a	reason	for	it,	and	that	would	be	that	it’s	difficult	to	
see”.	Drivers	suggested	that	even	without	the	stop	sign	they	would	slow	down	considerably,	and	
possibly	stop	completely,	because	of	the	RLX.	
	 3.5.2.	 Rolling	stops.	The	two	rolling	stop	CDM	interviews	were	with	novice	drivers	who	
proceeded	through	RLX	1	with	minimum	speeds	of	3.9km/h	and	7.2km/h.	Both	drivers	believed	they	had	
stopped	completely	and	their	responses	were	similar	to	those	drivers	who	did	stop	completely.	
Specifically,	their	stated	goals	were	to	cross	safely	and	to	stop	at	the	RLX	and	check	for	trains;	the	stop	
sign	was	the	most	influential	cue	in	their	decision-making;	and	they	considered	it	an	automatic	decision	
with	no	time	pressure.	Both	drivers	believed	they	used	all	the	information	available,	but	said	additional	
information	would	have	been	helpful.	One	driver	suggested	active	controls	(e.g.,	“Lights...and	having	
boom	gates.	So	you'd	know	from	a	distance	how	far	away	the	train	is”)	and	the	other	suggested	an	
advance	warning	sign	that	explicitly	mentioned	that	the	stop	sign	was	at	an	RLX	(e.g.,	“I	was	confused	
whether	[the	stop	sign]	was	before	or	after	the	tracks.	Yes,	stop	at	the	railway	crossing	or	something,	
yes,	to	make	it	a	bit	more	clear”).		
	 When	describing	how	they	drew	on	previous	experience,	one	mentioned	general	driving	
experience,	the	other	mentioned	knowledge	of	road	rules,	and	both	mentioned	experience	with	stop	
signs	in	general:	“Just	having	to	stop	at	the	stop	signs.	So	you	know	when	you	see	one,	you	have	to	stop	
no	matter	what.”	They	were	more	forthcoming	with	alternative	actions	than	drivers	who	stopped	
completely,	with	both	suggesting	that	they	could	have	proceeded	through	without	stopping,	but	they	
chose	to	stop	because	they	are	law	abiding.	One	driver	suggested	they	could	have	re-routed	to	avoid	
the	RLX	altogether.	
	 3.5.3.	 Unintentional	non-compliance.	The	five	CDM	interviews	with	non-compliant	drivers	
included	three	who	reported	unintentional	non-compliance	and	two	intentional	violations.	These	drivers	
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differed	in	situation	awareness	and	decision-making,	consistent	with	Reason	et	al.’s	(1990)	distinction	
between	errors	and	violations	having	unique	psychological	underpinnings,	and	so	are	described	
separately.	
	 Three	drivers	described	unintentional	non-compliance	at	RLX	1,	with	minimum	speeds	of	11.0,	
14.3	and	16.8km/h.	All	failed	to	notice	the	stop	sign,	and	suggested	this	was	because	they	were	focused	
on	other	aspects	of	the	environment.	These	included	the	RLX	itself,	looking	for	trains,	the	road	surface,	
the	T-intersection	after	the	RLX	and	other	road	users	at	or	near	the	RLX.	Their	stated	goals	were	to	look	
for	trains	and	cross	safely.	The	primary	factors	influencing	their	decisions	varied	between	individuals,	
but	included	the	RLX	itself	(e.g.,	tracks,	“LOOK	FOR	TRAINS”	sign),	the	absence	of	a	train,	safety,	and	the	
presence	of	other	road	users.	All	indicated	they	habitually	slow	for	RLXs.	
	 None	of	the	drivers	reported	experiencing	time	pressure,	and	indicated	it	was	a	relatively	quick	
or	automatic	decision	to	slow	and	then	proceed.	One	experienced	driver	opined	that	she	used	all	
information	that	she	attended	to	and	did	not	require	any	other	information,	as	she	relies	on	her	own	
assessment	of	the	situation	rather	than	RLX	signs	and	signals.	The	other	two	drivers	said	that	they	used	
all	information	except	the	stop	sign,	and	believed	that	active	controls	would	be	a	useful	addition	(the	
experienced	driver	suggested	flashing	lights,	while	the	novice	drivers	suggested	both	lights	and	booms).	
One	driver	added	that	clearing	vegetation	would	help	by	improving	visibility,	and	another	suggested	
improving	the	road	surface.	
	 To	help	make	their	decision,	drivers	reported	drawing	on	their	experience	of	learning	to	drive	
(e.g.,	the	novice	driver	stated	that	their	mother	always	made	them	stop	at	passive	RLXs)	and	general	
driving	experience.	The	novice	driver	mentioned	drawing	on	previous	experience	with	other	passive	
RLXs,	whereas	the	experienced	drivers	did	not	mention	drawing	on	any	knowledge	or	experience	that	
was	specifically	related	to	RLXs.	
	 When	asked	to	describe	possible	alternative	actions,	all	drivers	suggested	that	stopping	
completely	would	be	an	option	but	the	two	experienced	drivers	affirmed	they	had	made	the	
appropriate	decision:	stopping	was	unnecessary	(“it	didn’t	warrant	a	full	stop”),	but	a	faster	travel	speed	
would	be	unsafe.	Neither	of	these	drivers	executed	full	stops	at	the	other	stop-controlled	RLXs;	one	
driver	made	rolling	stops	at	RLX	2	and	3,	whereas	the	other	driver	committed	violations.	The	novice	
driver	indicated	they	would	stop	if	there	was	a	train	and	might	adopt	a	faster	travel	speed	if	the	road	
surface	was	better	and	they	knew	there	was	no	train	coming	(i.e.,	based	on	familiarity	with	train	
schedules).	
	 3.5.4.	 Intentional	violations.	The	two	drivers	who	committed	intentional	violations	negotiated	
RLX	2	with	minimum	speeds	of	46.0	and	56.4km/h.	Both	acknowledged	the	stop	sign	during	their	verbal	
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protocols.	They	reported	slowing	slightly	and	looking	and	listening	for	trains.	Their	stated	goals	were	to	
cross	safely	without	slowing	too	much:	“it	would	require	a	lot	of	time	beforehand	to	slow	all	the	way	
down	to	a	complete	stop	and	speed	all	the	way	back	up	again.	So	you	may	as	well	keep	going.”		
	 Seeing	the	stop	sign	and	the	RLX	provided	a	cue	that	they	needed	to	decide	whether	to	stop,	and	
after	visually	scanning	the	environment	both	drivers	concluded	stopping	was	unnecessary.	Both	
nominated	the	absence	of	trains	as	the	primary	factor	influencing	their	decision.	They	described	visibility	
at	the	RLX	as	good	and	stated	they	had	adequate	time	to	ensure	that	no	trains	were	approaching.	Both	
reported	that	they	used	all	available	information,	but	one	suggested	the	addition	of	flashing	lights	would	
be	helpful.		
	 One	of	the	drivers	reported	experiencing	“a	bit”	of	time	pressure	in	making	their	decision	and	
was	surprised	by	the	speed	at	which	they	drove	through	the	RLX;	this	driver	stopped	completely	at	RLX	1	
and	made	a	rolling	stop	at	RLX	3.	The	other	driver	reported	no	time	pressure	and	felt	the	decision	was	
appropriate;	this	driver	also	committed	violations	at	RLX	1	and	3.	
	 When	asked	about	previous	experience	that	informed	their	decision,	both	drivers	mentioned	
having	extensive	experience	driving	across	RLXs,	including	passive	RLXs.	Both	noted	that	in	the	local	area	
RLXs	are	common	but	trains	are	rare,	which	affected	their	decision-making:	“I	don't	have	much	
experience	of	trains.	I've	never	actually	stopped	at	a	crossing…	[In	Bendigo]	you	cross	railway	tracks	
relatively	frequently	but	you	rarely,	rarely	have	to	stop.”		
	 When	asked	to	consider	alternative	possible	actions,	both	drivers	suggested	that	they	could	have	
stopped.	One	also	suggested	several	other	alternatives,	including	re-routing	or	turning	off	the	road	if	a	
train	was	approaching.		
4.	 Discussion	
The	current	study	provided	an	in-depth	analysis	of	driver	behaviour	at	stop-controlled	RLXs.	The	
decisions	made	by	participants	can	be	broadly	categorised	as	complete	stops,	rolling	stops,	
unintentional	non-compliance,	and	intentional	violations.	This	variability	reinforces	the	notion	that	even	
when	faced	with	the	same	RLX	infrastructure,	drivers	may	interpret	the	situation	differently	and	exhibit	
vastly	discrepant	behaviours.	The	key	findings	from	each	form	of	decision	are	discussed	below.	
4.1.	 Compliant	and	cautious	drivers		
The	most	common	behaviours	observed	in	the	current	study	were	complete	(59%)	and	rolling	
stops	(27%),	which	participants	indicated	was	an	automatic	rule-based	decision.	Interestingly,	some	of	
the	drivers	who	made	rolling	stops	believed	that	they	had	stopped	completely.	Consistent	with	this,	
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there	were	few	differences	between	drivers	who	made	complete	and	rolling	stops,	especially	with	
respect	to	travel	speeds	and	duration	of	visual	checks.	Participants	who	stopped	completely	appeared	
more	focused	on	the	stop	sign	and	emphasised	that	stopping	completely	was	the	only	sensible	action.	
Several	participants	noted	that	the	need	to	stop	was	a	legal	requirement,	with	some	explicitly	noting	
that	signs	are	placed	at	“dangerous”	RLXs.	
Compliance	in	the	current	study	was	higher	than	in	field	studies	(12-41%;	Russell	et	al.,	2007;	Tey	
et	al.,	2011),	but	comparable	to	simulator	studies	(60-74%;	Lenné	et	al.,	2011;	Tey	et	al.,	2013).	Three	
factors	can	explain	the	relatively	high	compliance	rates	in	simulator	and	on-road	studies	compared	with	
field	observations.	The	first	is	volunteer	bias:	participants	in	instrumented	vehicle	and	simulator	studies	
may	be	more	conscientious	and	safety-conscious.	Second,	participants	know	their	behaviour	is	being	
observed	and	recorded.	Finally,	Australian	road	rules	dictate	that	stop	signs	can	only	be	placed	at	RLXs	
with	restricted	sight	distance,	and	in	the	current	study	some	drivers	noted	that	stop-controlled	RLXs	are	
a	special	class	that	warrant	more	cautious	behaviour	than	other	passive	RLXs.	This	suggests	that	
compliance	with	stop	controls	increases	when	they	are	used	judiciously	and	drivers	are	aware	of	(and	
agree	with)	the	rationale	for	their	installation.	
4.2.	 Non-compliant	drivers	
Instances	of	non-compliance	can	be	examined	in	terms	of	both	preceding	factors	(e.g.,	speed,	
which	did	not	predict	non-compliance)	and	the	resulting	consequences.	Both	unintentional	and	
intentional	non-compliance	were	associated	with	less	extensive	visual	checks	for	trains,	which	is	
concerning	given	the	restricted	sight	distance	at	these	crossings.	Non-compliant	drivers	also	executed	
their	visual	checks	farther	back	from	the	RLX,	at	which	point	they	may	not	have	had	adequate	visibility	
down	the	tracks	to	detect	an	approaching	train,	given	the	restricted	visibility	at	all	three	RLXs.	In	
addition,	previous	research	has	found	train	horns	are	significantly	less	audible	in	moving	compared	to	
idling	vehicles	(Dolan	and	Rainey,	2005),	which	implies	that	failing	to	stop	also	will	impair	drivers’	ability	
to	audibly	detect	trains.	Analysis	of	approach	speeds	indicated	that	100m	from	the	RLX,	travel	speeds	
were	similar	for	compliant	and	non-compliant	drivers;	however,	non-compliant	drivers	showed	
substantially	less	speed	reduction,	resulting	in	them	proceeding	through	the	stop	sign	at	speeds	of	up	to	
56km/h.	
Drivers	who	reported	unintentional	non-compliance	stated	that	they	failed	to	detect	the	stop	
sign	because	they	were	focusing	on	other	aspects	of	the	environment.	These	situations	all	occurred	at	
RLX	1,	which	several	drivers	considered	demanding	because	it	was	at	the	end	of	a	gravel	road,	
immediately	before	a	T-intersection.	It	was	the	only	RLX	that	had	a	white	crossbuck	against	a	red	
background	(see	Figure	2),	which	potentially	made	the	red	stop	sign	relatively	less	salient.	It	would	be	
worthwhile	conducting	more	comprehensive	field	trials	of	sign	salience	and	attentional	capture,	to	
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ensure	signs	are	easily	detectable.	However,	of	the	drivers	interviewed	about	unintentional	non-
compliance,	only	one	indicated	that	they	would	have	stopped	if	they	had	noticed	the	sign.	This	suggests	
that	although	improving	sign	salience	will	reduce	unintentional	non-compliance,	some	drivers	might	
commit	intentional	violations	instead.	
Intentional	violators	acknowledged	the	stop	sign	but	made	a	conscious	decision	not	to	stop	
based	on	their	assessment	of	the	situation.	Two	factors	influenced	this	assessment.	First,	they	believed	
that	they	had	adequately	searched	for	oncoming	trains;	this	belief	is	erroneous	as	stop-controlled	RLXs	
in	Australia	have	inadequate	sight	distance.	Second,	they	reported	extensive	experiences	of	driving	
across	similar	RLXs	without	seeing	a	train.	This	is	consistent	with	previous	research	whereby	drivers	
suggested	the	appropriate	response	at	a	stop-controlled	RLX	is	to	“slow	down”	and/or	“look	for	trains”	
(Rudin-Brown	et	al.,	2012;	Tey	et	al.,	2013).	Observational	research	has	found	only	one-third	of	drivers	
make	adequate	visual	checks	at	low-frequency	passive	crossings	(Wigglesworth,	2001),	suggesting	
drivers	become	complacent	when	they	know	trains	are	rare.	Focus	group	research	has	also	found	young	
drivers	underestimate	the	risks	of	failing	to	scan	at	RLXs	or	failing	to	reduce	speed,	and	do	not	expect	to	
encounter	trains	at	passive	RLXs	(Davey	et	al.,	2008).		
4.3.	 Implications	
The	findings	suggest	non-compliance	at	stop-controlled	RLXs	can	involve	schema-based	errors.	
All	participants	had	repeated,	regular	exposure	to	RLXs,	as	the	local	area	had	a	very	high	density	of	RLXs;	
however,	most	did	not	regularly	drive	through	passive	RLXs	and	infrequently	encountered	trains.	
Further,	some	novice	drivers	had	never	encountered	a	train	at	an	RLX,	despite	having	over	12	months’	
solo	driving	experience,	and	being	required	to	have	120	hours	of	supervised	practice	before	obtaining	
their	licence.	It	appears	some	drivers	possess	schema	that	they	will	(almost)	never	encounter	a	train	at	a	
rural	RLX	(because	they	never	have	before),	which	leads	them	to	underestimate	risks.	For	example,	they	
do	not	realise	that	they	have	restricted	sight	distance,	as	having	never	encountered	a	train	previously	
they	have	never	had	an	opportunity	to	assess	the	adequacy	of	sight	distance	on	approach	to	an	RLX.	
Furthermore,	some	drivers	failed	to	detect	the	stop	sign,	because	it	is	not	a	cue	that	they	expect	to	
encounter	at	RLXs.	Some	compliant	drivers	also	reported	having	relevant	schemata	for	stop-controlled	
RLXs	(i.e.,	that	the	stop	sign	means	it	is	“dangerous”);	however,	other	compliant	drivers	appeared	to	
employ	basic	rule-based	decision-making	(i.e.,	“stop	at	stop	signs”).	The	diversity	of	responses	observed	
suggests	that	a	“one	size	fits	all”	approach	to	RLX	safety	is	likely	to	fail,	as	it	cannot	accommodate	the	
variety	of	decision-making	strategies	that	different	users	employ.		
The	current	findings	have	important	implications	for	RLX	design	and	safety.	The	fact	that	several	
participants	reported	failing	to	detect	stop	signs	suggests	that	more	salient	signage	and/or	earlier	
presentation	of	signage	may	be	required.	The	findings	also	raise	a	larger	question	around	whether	stop	
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signs	at	RLXs	are	necessary	or	appropriate.	Although	some	campaigns	explicitly	note	that	stop-
controlled	crossings	have	limited	sight	distance	(CARRS-Q,	2015),	the	current	study	suggests	many	
drivers	remain	ignorant	of	the	rationale	for	installing	stop	signs.	Alternative	design	solutions	may	be	
possible	that	address	some	of	the	key	risks	observed,	namely:	some	drivers	fail	to	detect	the	stop	sign;	
some	drivers	detect	the	stop	sign	but	do	not	realise	that	it	signals	an	“unsafe”	RLX	with	restricted	sight	
distance;	and	some	drivers	detect	the	stop	sign	but	ignore	it	because	they	do	not	expect	to	encounter	a	
train.	Redesign	opportunities	at	the	RLXs	could	be	coupled	with	education	campaigns	highlighting	the	
challenges	drivers	face	at	rural	RLXs,	particularly	the	fact	that	trains	can	be	masked	by	vegetation	on	
approach	to	RLXs,	that	train	schedules	can	change	or	be	unpredictable,	and	the	importance	of	checking	
for	trains	at	passive	RLXs.	
Our	findings	imply	that,	although	substantial	slowing	is	necessary	to	give	drivers	time	to	visually	
check	for	trains	at	passive	RLXs,	it	may	not	be	necessary	to	stop	completely	when	no	train	is	
approaching.	Drivers	who	made	rolling	stops	and	those	who	stopped	completely	spent	the	same	
amount	of	time	visually	checking	for	trains,	and	showed	similar	situation	awareness.	Stopping	
completely	may	be	problematic	for	some	vehicles,	such	as	heavy	vehicles,	which	lose	momentum	and	
require	considerable	time	to	regain	speed	and	clear	the	RLX.	Moreover,	as	noted	in	the	introduction,	
crash	analyses	have	yielded	conflicting	results	regarding	the	safety	performance	of	stop-controlled	RLXs	
(Austin	and	Carson,	2002;	McCollister	and	Pflaum,	2007;	Millegan	et	al.,	2009;	Raub,	2009;	Saccomanno	
et	al.,	2007;	Yan	et	al.,	2010a,	2010b).	Furthermore,	previous	researchers	have	argued	against	using	
stop	signs	at	RLXs	due	to	the	high	rates	of	non-compliance	observed,	due	to	concerns	this	may	
generalise	this	behaviour	and	become	non-compliant	at	stop-controlled	highway	and	road	intersections	
(Austin	and	Carson,	Lerner	et	al.,	2002;	Raub,	2009).	In	our	sample,	several	drivers	reported	generalising	
from	their	experience	with	road	intersections	to	make	their	stop-or-go	decision	at	the	RLX,	so	it	seems	
plausible	that	some	drivers	could	generalise	experience	from	RLXs	back	to	intersections.	Given	that	the	
underlying	aim	of	placing	a	stop	sign	at	an	RLX	is	to	provide	drivers	with	more	time	to	check	for	trains	
and	increase	safe	decision-making,	it	would	be	worth	focusing	future	RLX	design	efforts	on	interventions	
that	can	achieve	these	aims	without	requiring	drivers	to	stop	unnecessarily.	These	may	involve	traffic	
calming	and	speed	control	measures,	coupled	with	other	measures	that	make	it	easier	to	detect	
approaching	trains	(e.g.,	improving	sight	distance,	where	feasible)	and	encourage	greater	visual	
scanning.	
4.4.	 Limitations	and	future	directions	
Although	the	current	study	adds	to	the	literature	on	stop-controlled	RLXs,	it	has	limitations	that	
should	be	noted.	Most	problematic	is	the	fact	that	none	of	our	participants	encountered	trains	at	any	of	
the	passive	RLXs.	This	to	a	large	extent	reflects	the	usual	experience	of	users	of	rural	RLXs,	as	noted	by	
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our	participants;	our	novice	drivers	had	over	12	months’	solo	driving	experience	and	drove	across	RLXs	
frequently,	but	most	of	them	had	never	encountered	a	train	when	negotiating	a	RLX.	Experienced	
drivers	were	more	aware	of	the	potential	for	encountering	a	train,	but	several	of	them	mentioned	that	
trains	are	infrequent.	This	represents	a	practical	limitation	of	studying	rural	RLXs	in	naturalistic	settings:	
it	is	relatively	rare	for	road	users	to	encounter	a	train	at	a	rural	RLX,	so	it	is	hard	to	study	their	responses	
without	artificially	manipulating	the	situation	(e.g.,	using	a	closed	track,	with	a	train	that	comes	when	
the	participant	is	approaching).	For	this	reason,	several	previous	studies	have	used	simulation	as	a	
means	to	explore	drivers’	responses	to	trains	in	rural	environments	(e.g.,	Lenné	et	al.,	2011;	Rudin-
Brown	et	al.,	2012;	Tey	et	al.,	2013).	
Another	limitation	is	that	the	current	sample	size,	for	both	participants	and	RLXs,	was	relatively	
small.	Notably,	the	sample	of	compliant	drivers	was	much	larger	than	the	sample	of	violators,	and	there	
was	relatively	high	consistency	in	both	behaviour	and	self-reported	cognitions	among	compliant	drivers.	
In	contrast,	drivers	who	violated	the	stop	controls	reported	more	diverse	motivations	and	cognitions.	
Thus	although	our	findings	reveal	some	drivers’	reasons	for	committing	violations	at	stop-controlled	
RLXs,	caution	is	urged	when	generalising	these	results	(especially	the	proportion	of	drivers	reporting	
each	factor)	to	the	broader	population.	One	option	for	future	research	would	be	to	conduct	a	long-term	
self-report	study	of	road	users	who	commonly	encounter	passive	RLXs;	for	instance,	asking	drivers	to	
keep	a	diary	record	of	how	many	RLXs	they	encounter	each	day	and	the	events	that	occur.	We	
previously	used	a	similar	method	to	explore	how	road	users	make	stop-go	decisions	at	RLXs,	with	the	
diary	questions	structured	around	CDM	prompts	(Beanland	et	al.,	2016;	Mulvihill	et	al.,	2016).	However,	
participants	only	completed	the	CDM	if	they	saw	a	train	on	approach	to	the	RLX,	so	the	data	yielded	
very	few	encounters	with	passive	crossings.	Future	research	could	expand	on	this	by	having	rural	road	
users	complete	CDM	diaries	for	all	passive	RLX	encounters,	regardless	of	train	presence,	to	gain	deeper	
understanding	of	the	factors	that	influence	their	decision-making.	
5.	 Conclusions	
The	current	study	explored	factors	associated	with	drivers’	compliance	or	non-compliance	with	
stop	signs	at	rural	RLXs.	Most	participants	exhibited	compliant	behaviour,	which	they	described	as	an	
automatic,	rule-oriented	response.	In	contrast,	drivers	who	violated	the	stop	sign	either	failed	to	detect	
its	presence,	or	saw	the	sign	but	disregarded	it	because	they	underestimated	the	risks	of	proceeding	
(i.e.,	over-estimated	sight	distance).	These	findings	highlight	avenues	for	improving	safety	at	rural	RLXs	
through	avenues	including	infrastructure	design	and	education	and	awareness	campaigns.	
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